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1. Introduction
A relatively high level of social stability and a certain degree of tolerance are char-
acteristic of Dutch society to the present day. In spite of the inﬂux of immigrants 
and the presence of ethnic minorities there is very little racial conﬂict. Even in 
these times of economic depression, disputes between unions and employers are 
not fought to the bitter end. In the political decision-making process compromises 
are preferred over polarisation.1 Experts play an important role in bridging the 
differences. There is a tendency in the Netherlands to leave it to the experts 
to decide on normative issues, such as under which circumstances euthanasia 
is admissible or whether or not the sale of certain drugs should be tolerated. 
Normative issues are reduced to technical, empirical questions for the experts 
to answer. In this way the issues are depoliticised: they are still on the political 
agenda, but the ﬁerceness of the debate is tempered by the facts and rational 
considerations provided by the experts. The land of ministers and merchants is 
now the land of experts.
Experts also dominate the administration of justice. There is no jury system 
in the Netherlands and neither is there any input from laymen in the judiciary. 
Judges are formally appointed by the Minister of Justice, but they are de facto 
appointed on the recommendation of their peers. The administration of criminal 
justice is equally dominated by professionals. Police chiefs and public prosecu-
tors are appointed on merit, not democratically elected based on their political 
preferences. This professionalisation is based on a ﬁrm belief in the democratic 
beneﬁts of the trias politica, which ﬁnds particular expression in the relatively 
autonomous position assigned to the judiciary. The boundary between ʻpolitics  ʼ
and ʻjustice  ʼ is carefully guarded for the sake of the rule of law. There is a 
general wariness among judges and public prosecutors of the politicisation of 
the administration of justice. Opinions expressed by the Minister of Justice or 
statements by politicians on speciﬁc criminal cases are easily interpreted by the 
professionals as attacks on their independence. According to a recent poll, 85 per 
1  For an informative ʻguidebook  ʼto the Netherlands, see Shetter (2002).
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cent of judges and prosecutors hold the view that politicians should not express 
any opinions on cases that are still under judicial consideration.2 
The non-political, professional character of the administration of justice in the 
Netherlands proved to be a fertile breeding ground for the emergence of another 
type of expert: the research scholar. The ministries involved, the police, the public 
prosecutor, the judiciary, as well as the prison and probation services show a great 
deal of interest in research results. Scientiﬁc research plays an important role in 
the planning and assessment of government policies. Since 1973 the Ministry of 
Justice has its own research institute (the WODC – the Research and Documenta-
tion Centre), the largest Dutch institute in the ﬁeld of justice, employing over 75 
researchers and statisticians. Also other major research groups were formed at a 
number of universities. It is important that the services involved are, generally 
speaking, willing to cooperate with the research projects. The researchers are usually 
allowed to conduct observations and interviews and have access to case ﬁles. Over 
the past 30 years, a series of empirical studies was carried out into subjects as diverse 
as selectiveness in prosecution and the meting out of punishment, evaluations of 
new measures and sanctions, the effects of sanctions and patterns of recidivism. The 
ﬁeld of organised crime has also been studied extensively since the early 1990s.3 
In this context, the research by Van Duyne (Van Duyne et al., 1990; Van Duyne, 
1995), the research group Fijnaut (Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie, 1996; Fijnaut 
et al. 1998), Bovenkerk (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz, 1998; Bovenkerk, 2001), and 
the research group of the organised crime monitor (Kleemans et al., 1998, 2002) 
must be mentioned.
Other research projects were carried out on the effects of policies against 
organised crime. In a large-scale empirical study the effectiveness of new legisla-
tion aimed at depriving organised crime of its illicit earnings was evaluated by 
Nelen and Sabee (1998). The researchers examined the effects of the law, using 
interviews and ofﬁcial statistics, on the number of dispossession proceedings and 
the actual recoveries as ruled by the courts. In 1999, Kruissink, Van Hoorn and Boek 
published their research into the effects of the deployment of inﬁltrators in major 
investigations of organised crime (1999). What is remarkable about this project 
was the access the researchers gained to police ﬁles describing the inﬁltrations. 
Based on these ﬁles and on interviews with police ofﬁcers and public prosecutors, 
2  ʻRechterlijke macht onder vuurʼ, Vrij Nederland, 11 October 2003.
3  With a few exceptions, all Dutch professors of criminology have shown an interest in 
studying organised crime and/or the ﬁght against this phenomenon. Frank Bovenkerk 
(Utrecht), Gerben Bruinsma (Leiden), Henk Van de Bunt (Amsterdam, Rotterdam), 
Petrus Van Duyne (Tilburg), and Cyrille Fijnaut (Tilburg) have all published on organised 
crime in recent years. 
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Kruissink et al. assessed the effectiveness of the deployment of undercover agents 
in view of the ﬁnal results of the investigation. The effectiveness of legal measures 
targeting money laundering, such as the obligation for ﬁnancial service providers 
to report all unusual ﬁnancial transactions to a focal point within the police force, 
was studied by Terlouw and Aron (1996) and by Faber and Van Nunen (2004).
During the course of these projects, all the above-mentioned researchers 
– with the exception of most members of the Fijnaut group4 – were employed 
by the WODC. The WODC has therefore been the leading centre for research on 
the effects of policies designed to combat organised crime. The standing of the 
centre, as part of the Ministry of Justice, turned out to be an advantage in carrying 
out research on sometimes highly delicate matters. More recently, research on 
policies was also undertaken outside of the WODC: a commercial agency studied 
the effects of ﬁnancial police investigations (Faber and Van Nunen, 2002) and the 
Vrije Universiteit (Free University) is evaluating the results of the administrative 
approach to organised crime in Amsterdam (Huisman et al., 2004).
The results of these research projects will be discussed later on, but one can 
already conclude that a lively tradition of research into the delicate theme of organ-
ised crime is developing in the Netherlands. The question is, of course, whether or 
not the results of these scholarly inquiries are of any importance to the authorities 
and the general public when it comes to the issue of tackling organised crime. For 
instance, how have government policies to ﬁght organised crime developed over the 
years? What was the role of research in this development? In section 2, it will be 
argued that organised crime appeared high on the political agenda in the early 1990s, 
in marked contrast to the Dutch tradition of politicians staying away from judicial 
matters. The general public as well as the politicians were seriously concerned about 
the problem of organised crime and both were in favour of far-reaching measures. 
Incidents and journalists  ʼopinions rather than scholarly knowledge determined 
the substance and the outcome of the public debate. Section 3, describes the most 
signiﬁcant measures taken in the ﬁght against organised crime, and discusses their 
effectiveness in the light of the available ﬁgures and evaluation studies. Section 4 
deals with a number of organisational developments in the police and in the Public 
Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce. In conclusion, section 5 offers a summary and discussion.
4  The research group consisted of Cyrille Fijnaut, Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Bruinsma and 
Henk Van de Bunt. The ﬁrst three members were professors of criminology at different 
universities, during the time of the research Van de Bunt was the director of the WODC 
and professor of criminology in Amsterdam. 
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2. Developments in Organised Crime Policies
Over the past two decades, major changes have taken place in the public debate on 
crime and crime prevention. Crime has undoubtedly become a political issue. Since 
the early 1980s the general public as well as many politicians became increasingly 
critical of the effectiveness and efﬁciency of the administration of criminal justice, 
whereas in the past the ﬁght against crime was entirely entrusted to the professionals. 
Between 1980 and 1984 recorded crime doubled in the Netherlands. Compared to 
the situation in 1970 the numbers quadrupled, while the expenditure on the police 
force and the justice system lagged far behind. Crime became a visible problem, a 
reality facing every citizen directly or indirectly, at one time or another, and for many 
citizens and politicians this constituted proof that the administration of criminal 
justice was not effective. In addition, the overburdening of the justice system led 
to sensational mistakes, as well as capacity problems resulting in cases being held 
over and a shortage of prison cells.
2.1. Policy Plan Society and Criminality (1985)
In 1985, the government drew up a white paper on the ﬁght against crime that 
was to have major consequences for the administration of criminal justice in the 
Netherlands. For the ﬁrst time in Dutch parliamentary history, politicians concerned 
themselves in-depth with the future direction of crime control. The white paper, 
entitled Samenleving en criminaliteit (Society and Criminality), was met with 
approval from political parties on all sides of the political spectrum. The plan was 
typically Dutch in that it managed to forge a compromise between the right and the 
left on a subject as charged as crime control, but it was by no means a watered-down 
document. It had a visionary quality and it contained an innovative policy plan 
pointing to new directions in crime prevention. 
The document did not propose a ʻmore-of-the-same approach  ʼto keep up with 
the rise in crime, i.e. more personnel for the police force and the justice system 
and more prison cells. More money was certainly allocated to these areas, but the 
most important message of the white paper was that the effort to control the crime 
problem should no longer be a matter for the police and the justice system alone. 
The paper stated: 
Maintaining law and order is not exclusively the task of the police and the 
justice system. In the judgment of the government, the rise in petty crimes, 
mostly committed by minors, could and should be halted by inducing an 
increased sense of responsibility in parents, local residents, local authorities 
and other social organisations with a view to crime prevention (Samenleving 
en criminaliteit, 1985: 13). 
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The document refers to increased surveillance by individuals and organisations, 
as well as to ʻtechno-preventionʼ. It also suggests a strengthening of the ties 
between adolescents and society. The emphasis in this policy document is clearly 
on preventing crime, especially by mobilising people and services outside of the 
justice system.
In dealing with serious crime, ʻ especially organised crime, including trafﬁcking 
in hard drugsʼ, the paper announced a policy of tough criminal prosecution, ʻthe 
exclusive task of the police force and the justice systemʼ.5 This repressive side of 
the white paper did not receive as much attention in the mass media and in the 
political debate as the more benevolent approach to petty crime propagated in 
the same document. The plan stated, without a clear empirical foundation, that 
although the Netherlands had long been exempt from the problem of organised 
crime, a ʻ large-scale underworld rooted in society  ʼwas now threatening to emerge. 
The white paper allocated considerable funds to the strengthening of inter-regional 
police cooperation in the areas of intelligence and investigation dealing with 
organised crime. 
The parties on the left as well as the right agreed with the two-pronged strategy: 
the prevention of petty crimes and a tough approach to organised crime. The 
policy plan is an example of what Garland terms the ʻ responsibilisation  ʼof society 
(Garland, 1996: 445-71). Encouraged and partially funded by central government, 
local authorities and the business community did indeed invest in the prevention 
of petty crime. By emphasising the role of society as a whole the white paper 
indicated that the ﬁght against crime is not only the mandate of professionals, but 
also of the political community. In this way, the government document conﬁrmed 
the growing interest in the ﬁght against crime from local political authorities. At 
the local level, mayors and public prosecutors became partners in consultations 
with the police on their priorities and procedures. 
Crime policies embedded at the local political level resulted in the neglect of 
supra-local organised crime. Why would the mayor of a town plagued by burglaries 
and robberies, have detectives work many months on international organised crime 
that did little visible damage to the community? In other words, the short-term 
effects of the white paper were an increase in funds for the criminal justice systemʼs 
ﬁght against organised crime, but in the public and political arena the attention 
was still focused on the problem of petty crimes. This situation would change 
dramatically at the end of the 1980s.
5  Bank fraud, environmental crimes, and illegal gambling are also mentioned in the 
document. All these different kinds of crime were classiﬁed as organised crime.
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2.2. The Turnabout
In 1988, crime journalist Bart Middelburg published a book with the ominous 
title The Maﬁa in Amsterdam (Middelburg, 1988). He described how members of 
American maﬁa families had tried to run illegal casinos in Amsterdam in the 1970s. 
His ﬁndings were later conﬁrmed by Block (1991) and by Fijnaut and Bovenkerk 
(1996), but at the time his book was met with disbelief. These reactions were 
typical of the prevailing climate, where stories about the seriousness of organised 
crime were laughed off as myths. However, at the end of the 1980s the Amsterdam 
police pointed for the ﬁrst time to the threat posed by organised crime. Leading 
police ofﬁcers conﬁdentially briefed members of Parliament and prosecutors, 
especially on the dominant position of several Dutch and Surinamese criminals 
in the international trafﬁcking of cannabis and cocaine. Possible penetration by 
these criminals into the legitimate world (economy, real estate, politics) was at the 
forefront of the discussions.
A team of police crime analysts drew up a nationwide quantitative overview of 
criminal groups in the Netherlands in 1988. The analysts  ʼdeﬁnition of organised 
crime leaned heavily on images of organised crime in the United States and on 
American publications. The team sent questionnaires to police forces all over the 
country asking them if they were aware of the existence of groups that would meet 
one or more of the following ﬁve criteria: 
 – Is the group active in several ﬁelds (drugs, weapons, fraud, among others)?
 – Is there a hierarchy and a ﬁxed assignment of tasks?
 – Is there an internal system of sanctions, with rewards and punishments?
 – Are the proceeds of crime being laundered with the aid of experts?
 – Does the group make use of corruption (business world, government)?
It was left to the police forces to answer the questions per group. It later turned out 
that different police forces answered the questions differently and there were also 
problems with non-response and double-counting. The results of this nationwide 
stock-taking were nevertheless published without reservations: according to the 
report there were 189 criminal groups that met one or more criteria. Three groups 
were supposed to meet all ﬁve of them (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 10-13). The problem 
with this statement of affairs was that the results were published but the methodol-
ogy kept secret. 
The publication of the number of cases of organised crime drew considerable 
media attention. The public at large as well as the politicians became convinced that 
the problem of organised crime in the Netherlands had been grossly underestimated. 
In 1990 this impression was reinforced by an empirical study published by the 
WODC, written by Petrus Van Duyne, Ruud Kouwenberg and Gerard Romeijn, 
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who made use of police ﬁles to sketch a broad panorama of ʻorganised crimeʼ, 
ranging from drug trafﬁcking to cases of entrepreneurial crime, including trading 
in waste material and value added tax (VAT) fraud. The unintended result of this 
publication was a growing unease, mainly because the authors used the rather broad 
deﬁnition of organised crime as crime committed by ʻ criminal entrepreneurs.  ʼPetrus 
Van Duyne put the distinction between criminal entrepreneurs and the legitimate 
industry into perspective. He objected to the idea of organised crime penetrating 
into the legitimate world by stating that ʻ more and more sections [of the legitimate 
industry] are affected by crime enterprises, not because of an outward threat by 
the superior “evil genius” of organised crime, but because of the venality of the 
so-called “upperworld”  ʼ(Van Duyne, 1991: 69). 
In addition to these research publications, a number of incidents played an 
important role in making the public aware of the problem of organised crime, 
particularly the killing of the so-called maﬁa boss Klaas Bruinsma on the streets 
of Amsterdam in 1991. For several years newspapers had been reporting on his 
involvement in the import and wholesale trafﬁcking of cannabis. The newspaper 
articles about his ʻempireʼ, his wealth and the killings he ordered, were met with 
disbelief at ﬁrst, but his assassination was proof to many that the Netherlands was 
facing a serious social problem, the contours of which were still unclear. The initial 
disbelief turned into a sense of urgency. In 1992, the Dutch government, at the 
request of Parliament, issued a white paper on the ﬁght against organised crime.
2.3. White Paper ʻOrganised Crime in the Netherlands  ʼ(1992) 
In spite of the fact that there was little precise information in 1992 on the true 
nature and size of organised crime in the Netherlands, the Minister of Justice 
made some ﬁrm statements in that same year. He argued that as a result of the 
large proﬁts made by drug dealers ʻmodern criminal organisations and the legal 
economy are interwoven to a much larger degree than in the past  ʼ(Nota, 1992-
1993: 2). The fact that not much was known empirically about the exact shape of 
the problem did not stop him from reaching ﬁrm conclusions; rather, the lack of 
hard facts was presented as a subject of concern, to the extent that the problem 
of organised crime was its invisibility: ʻIt goes without saying that all we know 
about organised crime is merely the tip of the iceberg  ʼ(Nota, 1992-1993: 3). The 
white paper continued with a reinforcement of the anxiety existing in society: ʻIn 
our judgment, the threat to the Dutch society emanating from present-day criminal 
organisations should be taken very seriously in view of the far-reaching economic 
and moral implications  ʼ(Nota, 1992-1993: 8). The paper further stated that these 
organisations were active in the illegal drug trade, prostitution, gambling and the 
arms trade, and engaged in fraud. In addition to the material and ﬁnancial damage 
these organisations caused, there was also the danger of their gradually becoming 
embedded in the legitimate world, with all the corrupting inﬂuences that entailed 
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for Dutch society. The importance of this white paper lies in the fact that it not 
only advocated a tougher, more repressive approach to organised crime, but also 
suggested preventive measures allowing a role for society. In this respect, the 
white paper departed from the approach advocated in 1985, which placed the 
responsibility for the ﬁght against organised crime exclusively in the hands of the 
police and the justice system.
The 1992 paper cited the results achieved locally in the United States through an 
integrated approach by the administration and the criminal justice system regarding 
certain forms of organised crime. It mentioned the New York State Organised 
Crime Task Force, which successfully tackled organised fraud and corruption in 
the construction industry (Nota, 1992-1993: 9).
The interest in the American preventive approach was the direct result of the 
initiative taken by Cyrille Fijnaut, then professor of criminology in Rotterdam 
and Leuven, to organise a conference attended by members of the New York State 
Task Force and Dutch ofﬁcials and academics. Fijnaut thought the Dutch could 
beneﬁt from the American experiences. He praised the Task Forceʼs innovative 
recommendations, which focus on the need for preventive strategies, and suggest 
pro-active strategies that differ markedly from traditional reactive law enforcement 
approaches that have proved inadequate in ﬁghting organised crime (Fijnaut and 
Jacobs, 1991: vi). There is no doubt that this conference has had a major impact 
on the development of Dutch strategies to combat organised crime, because, in 
spite of the sense of urgency, the 1992 white paper contained preventive measures 
as well as the reﬂex of tough repression. 
In the policy plan, several measures concerning preventive action against 
organised crime were mentioned, such as enlarging the defensibility of the 
public administration against the threat of inﬁltration by criminal organisations, 
intensifying efforts to keep criminal organisations out of certain service and goods 
sectors by not granting them licences or subsidies, and cooperating with relevant 
professions (accountancy, notaries, lawyers) to prevent culpable involvement with 
organised criminals. The proposals to combat organised crime by penal methods 
sounded somewhat more familiar: the intensiﬁcation of cooperation between public 
prosecutors and police ofﬁcials, the formation of regional criminal investigation 
units, the improvement of the exchange of information between police forces and 
regulatory agencies (tax authorities, for example), the growth of the expertise on 
organised crime and the expansion of international cooperation.
The 1992 plan acquired great signiﬁcance. First, it provided a basis for the 
preventive approach of organised crime that would come to gain recognition in 
the Netherlands. Secondly, the paper cleared the way for police ofﬁcers and public 
prosecutors who were willing to ﬁght organised crime by ﬁre or by sword. The policy 
plan and the subsequent discussions in Parliament created an environment where 
the end – combating organised crime – seemed to justify all means and methods 
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in advance. Only a year after these discussions, a full-blown drama ensued. The 
ʻIRT affair  ʼwas born.
2.4.  An Unparalleled Internal Struggle within the Justice System: The ʻIRT 
Scandalʼ
Even in a small country like the Netherlands, the debate on the centralisation or 
decentralisation of the administration of criminal justice runs through the many 
reorganisations of the police force and the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce that have 
taken place in the past decades. 
Originally the structure of both ofﬁcial bodies was decentralised, but there is 
a deﬁnite tendency towards centralisation. At the end of the 1980s, there was a 
growing demand for more cooperation between the locally organised police forces, 
in particular with a view to the ﬁght against organised crime. From 1987 onward, 
several inter-regional investigation teams (Interregionale Recherche Teams, IRTs) 
were set up in the Netherlands. The largest one was a collaboration between three 
forces (Amsterdam, Utrecht, Haarlem/Schiphol Airport). It took more than two years 
of consultation with the relevant authorities in the police forces and the ofﬁces of 
the public prosecutor before this team could begin targeting criminal organisations. 
Notwithstanding the previous deliberations, it turned out that no clear agreements 
were made on which authority was responsible for the actual operations of the 
IRT, in this case for the deployment and the implementation of special methods 
of investigation. Right from the start, consultations on the supervision and the 
responsibility for the operations were hindered by the strained relations between 
the different police forces and ofﬁces of the public prosecutor. 
Once the IRT got into its stride, Klaas Bruinsma, one of its main targets, was 
murdered. The IRT continued the ﬁght against what was then called the ʻ Bruinsma 
heirsʼ, a trio also known as the ʻDelta groupʼ. A small circle of intelligence ofﬁc-
ers and a public prosecutor came up with a method to gain more insight into the 
closed world of this Delta group. The idea was to approach a number of criminals 
with known contacts to the group and ask them to work as police informers. In 
order for these people to be valuable to the police, and to give them a chance to 
rise in the supposed hierarchy of the Delta group, they were allowed to engage in 
criminal practices. They were permitted to import large amounts of soft drugs into 
the Netherlands and to trade with, among others, members of the Delta group. As a 
result, containers full of drugs owned by these police informers were guided through 
customs under police protection. This was supposed to enhance the reputation 
of the informers in the eyes of the Delta group which could improve their status 
within the hierarchy. The drugs were meant to be seized by the police later on, 
but on many occasions that never happened. Later on, it has been established that 
the method of ʻcontrolled delivery  ʼresulted in 285 tons of cannabis entering the 
Netherlands, 160 tons of which were never found by the police. As a consequence 
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of poor regulation and poor supervision of the police informers, the method of 
controlled delivery boiled down to ʻuncontrolled deliveries  ʼon the drugs market. 
The same method of ʻuncontrolled delivery  ʼwas used to ship ecstasy tablets from 
the Netherlands to England. It is not clear exactly how many tablets were exported 
under the watchful eye of the Dutch police, but a parliamentary investigation later 
estimated that there must have been millions. Part of the deal between the police 
and their informers was that the smugglers were allowed to keep the proceeds. At 
the end of 1993, the leaders of the Amsterdam police force found out about these 
operations, which were devised by ofﬁcers from the other two police forces in the 
IRT. The Amsterdam police stated that they could not take responsibility for these 
poorly regulated and poorly supervised methods and cancelled the agreement with 
the other two forces. To the dismay of the general public and the politicians, the 
IRT was dissolved. The decision was announced in a press release, but in view of 
the secret nature of the investigation methods, no further statements were made 
about the motive behind the decision.
The dissolution of the IRT dominated the minds of the police and the justice 
system throughout the 1990s. The parties involved hurled reproaches at one another 
about incompetence, mismanagement and even corruption. Almost immediately 
after the disbandment of the IRT, the Ministers of Justice and Interior decided to use 
a tried and trusted method to depoliticise the issue: they appointed a commission of 
experts, named after its chairman Wierenga. The commission was not allowed much 
time for its inquiry into the causes of the dissolution of the IRT. Handicapped by 
this and by the opacity of the case, the Wierenga commission came to conclusions 
that later turned out to be wrong. Peace was not restored. On the contrary, the 
Wierenga commission only fuelled the crisis. The blame was placed squarely on 
the shoulders of Amsterdam. The commission concluded that the method used by 
the IRT was not illegal and that there were no indications that things had got out 
of hand.6 Under turbulent circumstances Parliament involved itself in the matter 
and this resulted in a preliminary study by a parliamentary working group. In 
October 1994, the working group advised Parliament to launch a parliamentary 
inquiry into the methods used by the police and the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce to 
investigate organised crime. The working group suggested that the dissolution 
of the IRT was not an isolated incident. Parliament agreed and a Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry, named after its chairman Van Traa, was set up, with the 
objective of bringing clarity to what was going on in the circles of the police and 
the public prosecutors. 
6  For more information on the Wierenga commission, see Van de Bunt et al. (2001).
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2.5. Controlling the Police
As a result of the IRT scandal, the performance by the police and the justice system 
faced tough public scrutiny. It almost seemed like the crime ﬁghters posed a bigger 
threat to the rule of law than organised crime itself. In its report (1996), the com-
mission published a great deal of inside information about the way the ﬁght against 
organised crime had been conducted so far. First of all, the commission gave a 
clear insight into the nature of the crime problem, using extensive criminological 
research carried out by the Fijnaut research group. The threat posed by organised 
crime – expressed in no uncertain terms in 1992 – was now reduced to its proper 
proportions. There was no evidence found that criminal groups at either the national 
or the local level had gained control of legitimate sectors of the economy by taking 
over crucial businesses or trade unions. Neither were there any indications that 
organised crime had penetrated the public administration or the political deci-
sion-making process. The research group nevertheless concluded that there were 
worrying developments in Amsterdam. Most of the real estate in the Red Light 
District was apparently in the hands of a number of criminal organisations and the 
local authorities had lost their grip of the situation.
Secondly, the Van Traa commission entered at length into the use of special 
methods of investigation (inﬁltration, observation, wire-tapping) and the manner in 
which judges and public prosecutors supervised the application of these methods. 
The commissionʼs analysis of the ﬁght against organised crime forms the principal 
part of the parliamentary inquiry. The commission concluded that there was a 
ʻcrisisʼ. In the period between 1990 and 1995 all parties were convinced of the need 
for ﬁrm action against organised crime, but there was a lack of clear and adequate 
guidelines. The legislator and the judiciary gave too much latitude to the police and 
the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce, who did not know exactly what to do, as the report 
states (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1995-1996: 414).
The commission also criticised the large number of separate organisations and 
collaborating bodies within the police, the justice system and the public administra-
tion, all playing their part in the ﬁght against organised crime. There was too much 
professional jealousy and not enough exchange of knowledge and information. 
Finally, the commission condemned the breakdown of authority in the police forces 
and the ofﬁces of the public prosecutor, referring in particular to the lack of clear 
guidance from public prosecutors in criminal investigations. Too many decisions 
were left to the discretion of individual police ofﬁcers; the obscure method of the 
ʻuncontrolled delivery  ʼbecame one of the most talked-about examples of this state 
of affairs (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1995-1996). The IRT scandal 
resulted in major changes in Dutch law. A few years ago several special investigative 
powers were regulated by law and more adequate supervision of these powers was 
established (see also section 3, infra).
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As a result of the involvement of Parliament in the 1990s, more information 
came to light about police operating procedures, the supervision by the public 
prosecutors and the criminals involved in the IRT scandal as either informers or 
targets. Unintentionally, secret information was also revealed, including the identity 
of several police informers. One of them demanded money from the Minister of 
Justice to seek refuge abroad. He received € 800,000 in compensation, but instead 
of ﬂeeing the country, he bought a villa in the Netherlands. This anecdote illustrates 
the distinct possibility that the police and the justice system had been taken for a 
ride. Who was running whom? Did the police get information about the criminal 
world through the informers, or did the criminals use these same informers to gain 
insight into police operations?
Three years later, in 1999, another parliamentary commission made a name for 
itself by claiming – on the basis of interviews with several intelligence ofﬁcers and 
a public prosecutor – that in the period 1992-1993 not only soft drugs and ecstasy, 
but also 15,000 kilos of cocaine (representing a street value of € 500 million) had 
been imported and sold under the protection of the IRT. The commission added 
that such large amounts of cocaine could not have been smuggled into the country 
without corrupt intelligence ofﬁcers. Between 1996 and 2001 an extensive criminal 
investigation was conducted into possible corrupt actions by a few investigators 
who had been involved – as was evident from the parliamentary inquiry – in the 
ʻuncontrolled deliveriesʼ. Because this method of investigation never yielded any 
relevant information but had been very proﬁtable to certain informers, it seemed 
that the ofﬁcers involved were corrupt and perhaps beneﬁted ﬁnancially from 
the ʻuncontrolled deliveriesʼ. After years of investigation by a large investigative 
team, no indications have come to light that the police ofﬁcers involved were 
indeed corrupt. They probably only acted clumsily, but they most certainly did not 
adequately justify their actions to their superiors and to the public prosecutors. It 
also appeared from the criminal investigation that there was no proof whatsoever 
for the statement made in 1999 by the parliamentary commission that 15,000 kilos 
of cocaine were imported through the ʻuncontrolled deliveriesʼ.7
7  Its results were so disappointing to many that they doubted whether the investigation was 
carried out properly. Together with Cyrille Fijnaut and the criminologist Hans Nelen, 
the author conducted an evaluation study into the course of this criminal investigation. 
Van de Bunt et al. (2001) concluded that the investigation may have been hampered by 
bureaucratic tensions and conﬂicts, but that the possibility of corruption was nonetheless 
investigated in a serious manner. 
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2.6. Towards a Safer Society (from 1996 to the Present) 
It was to be expected that the storm died down after all the excitement about 
organised crime and the ﬁght against it. At the end of the 1990s new crime problems, 
such as ʻsenseless violence  ʼ in the streets, incivilities, domestic violence and 
feelings of insecurity, demanded the attention of the media, the politicians and the 
administration of criminal justice. Citizens  ʼfeelings of insecurity have become an 
issue in the political debate. To the extent that these feelings are related to actual 
crimes, they are affected by street crime rather than organised crime. The most 
recent white paper from the Dutch government on crime prevention Towards a Safer 
Society (Naar een veiliger samenleving) pays little attention to organised crime, let 
alone to more speciﬁc themes like money laundering or contract killings. 
These days attention is focused on visible forms of crime, such as street violence, 
and forms of behaviour that are not so much ʻ illegal  ʼas ʻ asocial  ʼ– loitering, begging 
and trafﬁc offences.8
The fact that the public debate has calmed down cannot just be explained by 
other forms of crime demanding attention. Peace has returned to the Netherlands 
regarding the threat of organised crime. Unfounded fear gave way to conceptions 
of the nature of organised crime based on facts. Police ofﬁcers and politicians no 
longer equate organised crime in the Netherlands with the maﬁa. There is now talk 
of ʻnetworks  ʼand ʻﬂuid social groupsʼ, which at least sound less threatening than 
ʻmaﬁaʼ. Ideas about the criminal penetration of legitimate sectors gave way to the 
concept of ʻsymbiosisʼ, again less threatening than ʻpenetrationʼ. We also have to 
bear in mind that the problem of organised crime in the Netherlands is unlike that 
in some other European countries. For example, the Netherlands is not faced with 
the pressing problem of terrorism that monopolised the debate on organised crime 
in Spain, and it does not suffer from the intertwining between organised crime, the 
economic sectors and the political institutions, as is the case in Italy. Extortion, 
political corruption, and kidnapping connected with organised crime rarely happen 
in the Netherlands, if at all. Many forms of organised crime in the Netherlands boil 
down to international smuggling activities. Hence, the nature of organised crime 
in the Netherlands might be described as ʻtransit crimeʼ. Incidents such as the 
discovery of a large weapons cache, or the liquidation of well-known criminals in 
the streets, still draw the attention of the public and the politicians, but there is no 
8  Recently, the Dutch newspaper Trouw conducted a public opinion poll on the police 
and on public safety. A small majority agreed with the statement: ʻit is more important 
that the justice system deals with violence and burglary than with drug bossesʼ. In an 
earlier poll, conducted in 1998, only 30 per cent of those questioned agreed with this 
statement. These data illustrate the decline in public fear about the problem of organised 
crime (Trouw, 14 January 2004).
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longer any serious public anxiety in the Netherlands about the threat of organised 
crime, despite the fact that the police have not been able to solve any of the cases 
of the murdered criminal ﬁgures and are still in the dark about what is behind the 
weapons caches. 
The police and the justice system seem somewhat tired of the traditional 
nucleus of the Dutch organised crime problem, which is the trafﬁcking of illegal 
drugs. A white paper on the administration of criminal justice states that police 
attention should be focused ʻto a substantial degree  ʼon other forms of organised 
crime rather than on drugs trafﬁcking. Reference is made to the trade in chemical 
waste, medicines, blood or organs, and endangered species (Ministerie van Justitie 
et al., 2001:34). But these new priorities do not seem very realistic, since there is 
hardly any known involvement from organised crime in these areas. Furthermore, 
it remains to be seen whether or not the Netherlands has a lot of choice when listing 
its priorities. The transnational character of its organised crime problem calls for a 
certain amount of modesty in this respect. In the past years, foreign pressure and 
criticism have kept organised crime on the Dutch political agenda. The United States 
in particular has criticised the Netherlands for not doing enough to investigate and 
prosecute criminal organisations involved in the production and international trade 
of ecstasy. As a result of this kind of criticism, an additional € 20 million is spent 
annually on investigating this form of organised crime in the Netherlands. Many 
Dutch citizens consider these foreign comments an exaggeration of the situation 
and they view them as an uncalled-for criticism of the liberal Dutch drugs policies. 
The publicʼs interest in the subject of organised crime has subsided. After all the 
excitement in the 1990s, the pendulum has now swung back.
3. Crime Policies: Theory and Practice
In contrast to the ﬂuctuation in public attitudes, institutional attention to organised 
crime has been relatively consistent from the early 1990s to the present. Two 
different tacks have been taken. First of all, the Netherlands invested considerable 
effort in the prevention of organised crime, or more speciﬁcally, in measures not 
pertaining to criminal law. The innovative aspect of this approach lies in the fact 
that it is not primarily aimed at the perpetrators of organised crime, but rather 
at the various circumstances which facilitate organised crime. The second track 
followed the criminal approach, referred to here as ʻrepressionʼ. Over the past 15 
years, the repressive approach, aimed at catching the criminals, has seen some 
major developments. The most important changes in these two areas are described 
in the following. 
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3.1. Prevention
3.1.1. Anti-Money Laundering Efforts
The anti-money laundering effort is one of the cornerstones of the ﬁght against 
organised crime in the Netherlands. Money laundering was a non-issue until the 
end of the 1980s. It was associated with the ʻblack money  ʼthat ordinary citizens 
and companies tried to hide from the view of the tax authorities. It was not until the 
early 1990s that in the national political debate the connection was made between 
money laundering and the ﬁght against organised crime. This came about as a 
result of international discussions on the laundering of the proceeds of drug-related 
crimes, and not because the problem of the laundering and reinvestment of proceeds 
of crime had actually manifested itself in the Netherlands. The introduction in the 
Netherlands of anti-money laundering legislation was a direct consequence of the 
1991 European Economic Community (EEC) Directive on the Prevention of the 
Abuse of the Financial System (Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 18).9 Since 
the introduction of the MOT Act (Act on the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions 
– Wet Melding Ongebruikelijke Transacties) in 1994, ﬁnancial institutions such 
as banks, exchange ofﬁces, casinos and credit card companies are obliged by law 
to report unusual ﬁnancial transactions to a Financial Intelligence Unit (Meldpunt 
Ongebruikelijke Transacties).10 The police and public prosecutors have no direct 
access to the database of this unit, to ensure the privacy of legal and natural 
persons whose ﬁnancial transactions have been reported as unusual. It is up to the 
ofﬁcials of the unit to decide whether or not to transmit the reported transactions 
to the police and to a police unit called BLOM (Bureau Landelijk Ofﬁcier van 
Justitie Meldingen Ongebruikelijke Transacties – Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce for 
Anti-Money Laundering). 
The purpose of the MOT Act is twofold: the prevention of the abuse of the 
ﬁnancial system by laundering criminal funds, and the repression of money 
laundering itself. The emphasis is therefore not on combating organised crime, 
but in the political climate described in section 2 it was obvious to anyone that 
this sort of legislation was primarily intended to counteract money laundering by 
organised crime. Because of the perceived threat posed by organised crime and 
because there was already the anti-money laundering Directive, the government 
managed to pass the bill through Parliament in a relatively short time. There was 
considerable opposition at ﬁrst, especially voiced by the banks. They took the 
9  For a history of the Dutch law, see Mul (1999). 
10  At the same time, the Act on Customer Identiﬁcation for Financial Services was 
introduced, which obliges ﬁnancial institutions to ask customers for identiﬁcation. All 
records of ﬁnancial transactions must be stored for ﬁve years.
692
Organised Crime in Europe
view that the government was trying to burden them with a supervisory task not 
suitable for a commercial enterprise. It was also pointed out that banks would run 
the risk of damage claims from customers disagreeing with the disclosure of their 
ﬁnancial transactions. For this reason a legal stipulation was added protecting 
ﬁnancial institutions from civil suits resulting from unjust reports to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit.
Whereas the EEC Directive was limited to organised drug-related crimes, the 
Dutch legislator took a general approach to money laundering. The Act targets all 
ﬁnancial transactions, irrespective of the nature of the crimes connected with it, 
and opted for mandatory reporting of unusual ﬁnancial transactions. Objective as 
well as subjective indicators were developed to determine the unusual nature of 
a transaction. 
3.1.2. Reports of Unusual and Suspicious Transactions
Over the past ten years, hundreds of thousands of unusual transactions were 
reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit. The year 2002 in particular saw a 
marked increase, largely attributable to the growing number of reports of money 
transfers. The number of reports to the police of suspicious transactions also shows 
an upward trend:
Source: Financial Intelligence Unit, Annual Report 2003.
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It appears from information provided by the unit that the use of objective and subjec-
tive indicators in determining the unusual nature of transactions varies with the type 
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of ﬁnancial service provider. The vast majority of reports by exchange ofﬁces turn 
out to be based on an objective indicator (for instance, the amount changed is in 
excess of € 10,000), while almost 70 per cent of all reports by banks are based on 
the subjective assessment that the clientʼs behaviour and/or the type of transaction 
was ʻ unusual  ʼor, that a large amount was probably divided up into smaller amounts 
to stay within the € 10,000 limit. From this relatively high percentage of subjective 
decisions it can be deduced that banks no longer report all transactions that should 
have been reported, based on the implementation of objective indicators. In actual 
practice, the duty to report has evolved into the right or the possibility to report and 
this is recognised in the most recent annual report of the unit, which concludes that 
a system has developed in which the detection of unusual transactions is left to the 
discretion of the banks themselves (Meldpunt, 2003: 14). This is in anticipation of 
a development supported by the government to prevent over-reporting based on 
objective criteria only. In a recent white paper on The Integrity of the Financial 
Sector and the Fight against Terrorism the government announced that in future 
the emphasis should be on a risk-based rather than a rule-based system of reporting 
(Tweede Kamer, 2001-2002: 46).
3.1.3. Effectiveness of the MOT Act 
The Financial Intelligence Unit decides whether or not to transmit unusual transac-
tions as suspicious transactions to the police and to the BLOM, the police unit in 
charge of the database of suspicious transactions. Ofﬁcials of the unit make their 
assessments by matching the names of legal and natural persons against the names 
of persons on whom there is intelligence information available, or who are currently 
under police investigation. They also use their own research and experience to look 
for suspicious patterns in the lists of transactions.11 It is striking that over the past 
ten years much effort has been devoted to the drawing up of criteria for unusual 
transactions, while far less attention was paid to the question how the unit decides 
which transactions should be transmitted as suspicious to the BLOM. 
What are the effects of this system of mandatory reporting, or to be more 
speciﬁc, how many suspicious transactions are used in criminal investigations or 
actually lead to the launch of an investigation? Two researchers from the WODC 
published an empirical study in 1996. They concluded that in 1995 approximately 
2500 suspicious transactions were reported to the police (around 14 per cent of the 
total number of unusual transactions). Of these 2500 around 20 per cent were used, 
i.e. added to 45 ongoing criminal investigations. Only rarely did the information 
11  The unit developed a programme for the analysis of networks, resulting in 2001 in the 
uncovering of a criminal collaboration, based on 1100 money transfers (Meldpunt, 2001: 
31). 
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lead to the launch of an investigation by the police (Terlouw and Aron, 1996: 97). 
Since 1999, the BLOM has carried out random checks to ﬁnd out if suspicious 
transactions are used in police investigations. Of over 1900 cases, 15 per cent were 
used by the police to strengthen evidence and 14 per cent were used as ʻguiding 
informationʼ, which played a role in establishing priorities or a shift of focus in 
ongoing criminal investigations (BLOM, 2000).
The MOT Act system allows transactions to take place even when the ﬁnancial 
service providers regard them to be ʻunusualʼ. In 2002, almost all of the 24,741 
suspicious transactions were actually executed, only 145 were not (Meldpunt, 2003: 
7). What this means is that ﬁnancial service providers can execute transactions 
without reserve, even when they are convinced they are collaborating in money 
laundering. Disclosure to the Financial Intelligence Unit serves to exculpate them 
in this respect. If it turns out that the feedback from the justice system is inadequate, 
the Act unintentionally assists in the laundering of criminal funds under the watchful 
eye of the ﬁnancial service providers, and contributes towards the ʻuncontrolled 
delivery  ʼof the proceeds of crime. 
Recently, a new extensive MOT Act evaluation study was carried out, in par-
ticular into the services involved in the MOT Act chain. It concluded that all those 
concerned seemed to have lost sight of the original purpose, namely the prevention 
and detection of criminal offences, with a view to protecting the integrity of the 
ﬁnancial sector. The researchers concluded that after several years the interests 
of the reporting bodies have come to dominate the project. Many transactions are 
dutifully reported and the unit keeps track of the numbers, but it is unclear how 
all this relates to the integrity of the ﬁnancial sector or the ﬁght against money 
laundering. According to the researchers, the unit draws few lessons from the mass 
of information, and the preventive intentions of the Act (identifying patterns of 
money laundering, giving advice and making recommendations) do not live up to 
their promise (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: ch. 5).
3.1.4. Recent MOT Act Developments
At the end of 2001, a separate penalty provision for money laundering offences was 
created. Until then, money laundering was regarded as a form of receiving stolen 
goods, but since this implied proﬁting from someone elseʼs crimes, there was no 
possibility to prosecute criminals for laundering the proceeds of their own crimes. 
In 2002, charges were brought for money laundering on 107 occasions, in many 
cases against persons found in possession of large sums of money from unknown 
sources (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: ch. 5).
Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the ﬁnancing of terrorism has taken on a 
new urgency. The strong focus on the ﬁght against terrorism has revitalised the 
efforts put into controlling the integrity of the ﬁnancial sector. In 2002, the white 
paper on The Integrity of the Financial Sector and the Fight against Terrorism was 
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published (Tweede Kamer, 2001-2002). It stated in so many words that the ﬁght 
against money laundering must be intensiﬁed in light of the terrorist threat. Building 
on an EEC directive on money laundering, one of its intentions was to extend the 
system of mandatory reporting to such occupational groups as accountants, notaries, 
real estate agents and tax consultants.12 Despite heavy criticism from lawyers and 
notaries, the favourable momentum allowed the government to issue a decree in 
2003, which made a number of services by notaries, lawyers, accountants and real 
estate agents subject to powers of the MOT Act. According to this decree mandatory 
reporting should only apply to giving advice or the provision of assistance by, inter 
alia, lawyers and notaries for sale and purchase of property or companies, and the 
administration of cash, securities, and so on.13
Other ways to improve the effectiveness of the MOT Act were also suggested, 
such as by simplifying and speeding up procedures and methods. However, the 
forthcoming evaluation study mentioned above indicates that the relevant parties 
are pessimistic about the net result of these points of action in regard to the ﬁght 
against terrorism. They all emphasise the mainly symbolic value of these plans and 
argue that too much is expected from the system of mandatory reporting when it 
comes to terrorism (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004).
3.1.5. The Preventive Approach Takes Root
The MOT Act is just one of many examples of preventive measures against 
organised crime and it is clear that the prevention of organised crime is becoming 
increasingly accepted in the Netherlands. The preventive approach is characterised 
by the fact that it is not primarily aimed at the perpetrators of organised crime, but 
rather at the various circumstances that facilitate organised crime. The preventive 
approach addresses governments, civilians and enterprises and it attempts to make 
them feel responsible for reducing the opportunities for organised crime. 
It was noted in section 2 that the minds of policy-makers in the Netherlands 
were greatly inﬂuenced by a conference with members of the New York State 
Organised Crime Task Force, organised by Fijnaut in 1990. The Dutch emphasis 
on prevention was later taken on board by the European Union. Major European 
milestones showing the inﬂuence of Dutch policies were the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which stressed the importance of preventing crime (organised or otherwise) and the 
12  Directive 2001/97/EG of the European Parliament and European Council, Ofﬁcial 
Journal, L344/7.
13  In June 2003, by governmental decree, a number of services by notaries, lawyers, auditors 
and real estate agents have been subject to powers of the MOT Act. See Lankhorst and 
Nelen (2003) for more details.
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Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime (1997).14 This plan stated that ʻ prevention 
is no less important than repression in any integrated approach to organised crime, 
to the extent that it aims at reducing the circumstances in which organised crime can 
operateʼ. It also formulated a number of recommendations to make the preventive 
approach more speciﬁc: developing an anti-corruption policy within the public 
administration, making it possible to exclude persons convicted of offences relating 
to organised crime from tendering procedures, and introducing measures for the 
improved protection of certain vulnerable branches and professions. 
In the last ten years, a large number of measures with regard to the preven-
tion of organised crime were taken in the Netherlands (Van de Bunt and Van der 
Schoot, 2003). On the one hand, these measures aimed to improve the integrity and 
upgrade the instruments of public administration, in order to prevent its penetration 
by organised crime. On the other hand, legislation has focused on commercial 
enterprises and professions, with instructions to conduct transactions with greater 
diligence and to report any unusual transactions. 
In order to improve the integrity of its public administration, the Netherlands 
has worked on tightening up its corruption laws and increasing the maximum 
penalties.15 Within many areas of the civil service, codes of conduct were intro-
duced and organisational arrangements were made to ensure better supervision of 
civil servants in vulnerable positions.16 In many areas of business, it has become 
common practice that corporations and even individuals are required to engage 
in the systematic ʻsurveillance  ʼof normal business activities in order to detect 
and report signs of illegal activity or suspicious transactions. To avoid illegal 
migration, for example, Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) has stepped up its efforts to 
ensure that travellers have the proper documentation. In such cases, a system of 
ﬁnes imposed upon the carriers has provided a strong stimulus. In the chemical 
industry, companies and traders are required to report suspicious transactions 
involving approximately 25 chemical products that can be used for the production 
of illegal narcotics.17
14  This aspect was once again emphasised in the European Council Summit of Tampere 
in 1999. See the Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 
1999, points 41-2.
15  These changes took effect in 2001. See Hartmann (2001: 31-50).
16  Civil servants applying for ʻsensitive  ʼpositions are better screened and job rotation is 
stimulated in order to prevent civil servants from getting too deeply involved in certain 
tasks or situations. 
17  The Coordinated Struggle against Ecstasy (Samenspannen tegen XTC), Handelingen II 
2000/2001, 23 760, no. 14, 10-11.
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In Rotterdam, a platform for crime control was established with the purpose of 
reducing the crime risks in the port and the risks for businesses unwittingly involved 
in illegal activities. Participants are the relevant businesses in the harbour and 
state agencies, such as the police, customs, public prosecutorʼs ofﬁce and various 
municipal agencies. Together they aim to increase the awareness of all parties 
in the main port and their activities are not limited to merely offering vague advice.18 
In 2000, a guidebook was produced entitled Security Main Port Rotterdam (Re-
gionaal Platform Criminaliteitsbeheersing Rotterdam, 2000). The guide examines 
security management in general and the risks in business processes, personnel 
management, ﬁnances, information technology and computerisation, company 
grounds and premises in particular. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, occupational groups, such as lawyers and notaries, 
started developing their own internal guidelines on how to avoid culpable involve-
ment with criminal organisations. The guidelines for the legal profession drawn up 
in 1995 require lawyers to check the identity of clients with unusual requests. When 
a lawyer has doubts about the integrity and the intentions of a client, he is supposed 
to ﬁnd out more by questioning him, which may result in the termination of their 
relationship. This does not apply to clients seeking legal aid relating to a trial, but 
only to clients who ask lawyers for advice on, for instance, legal entities which seem 
to serve no other purpose than to mislead the tax department or the public prosecutor 
(Lankhorst and Nelen, 2003: ch. 7). It is not clear to what extent these guidelines are 
being observed. In the last few years, only a handful of violations of the guidelines 
came to the attention of a disciplinary tribunal (Spronken, 2001: 627).
3.1.6. The Case of Amsterdam
One section of the report by the parliamentary inquiry commission pertained to the 
organised crime situation in Amsterdam. The research for this part of the inquiry was 
carried out by Cyrille Fijnaut and Frank Bovenkerk. The results of their study sent 
shock waves through Amsterdam. On the basis of conversations with well-informed 
police ofﬁcers, Fijnaut and Bovenkerk concluded that 16 criminal organisations had 
been able to build up positions of economic power in real estate, bars and restaurants, 
especially in the famous Red Light District in the city centre. The report stated that 
the indecisiveness of the local authorities had created a fertile breeding ground for 
illegal and criminal activities in the district (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 138). In response 
to this, the city administration set up a special preventive programme to combat 
organised crime. As a result of this programme, action was taken on several fronts 
regarding, ﬁrst, the integrity of the civil service apparatus; secondly, the screening 
18  The complete guide as well as other information can be found at <http://www. 
portofrotterdam.com>.
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processes in the framework of public tender procedures; and thirdly, the inﬁltration 
of organised crime in certain areas and branches of industry in the city.19
First, a project was set up aimed at creating awareness amongst executives and 
civil servants on the nature, scope and development of corruption and fraud, and to 
update them on better ways to master these issues. The most important principle that 
arose was that an awareness of the risks of criminality should be institutionalised 
in the entire bureaucratic and political organisation of Amsterdam. This meant that 
in every service or branch concrete action had to be taken (vulnerability analysis; 
detecting opportunities for corruption and fraud). In addition, a special Integrity 
Bureau was set up, which was made responsible for the further implementation of 
prevention policies and the investigation of suspected cases of fraud or corruption. 
In 1996, a municipal directive was issued, making it mandatory for civil servants 
to report suspicions of fraud and corruption among colleagues to the Bureau. 
This directive was later widened to include conﬂicts of interest, physical violence 
and intimidation, deviant behaviour off duty, and misuse of authority. This broad 
deﬁnition of offences illustrates that the integrity policy has drifted away from its 
original goal, namely to stem the tide of organised crime. A recent evaluation study 
indicates that between 1996 and 2002, a total of 286 cases were reported, many of 
them concerned with suspicions of employee fraud and employee theft (129) and 
a lesser number with corruption (33 reports) (Nelen, 2003). The study concludes 
that the number of reports may have gone up, but that it is impossible to determine 
the meaning of this increase. Is this an increase in irregular behaviour, in awareness 
or in the willingness to report a colleague? 
Secondly, screening and security procedures were enacted to prevent companies 
with criminal connections from participating in public tendering procedures. 
Screening is conducted by a special agency, the Screening and Audit Bureau 
(SBA), under the direct authority of the mayor. To carry out its tasks properly, 
this agency not only uses its own expert analysts but also cooperates closely with 
the police, the Public Prosecution Service, the ﬁscal authorities and the municipal 
services. An evaluation study published in 2001 revealed that 20 per cent of the 
approximately 100 screenings that were carried out resulted in the exclusion of 
one or more companies from the public tender process. In the majority of cases 
companies were excluded because of insufﬁcient information or a lack of ﬁnancial 
guarantees. Some cases involved companies that were probably ﬁnanced with 
criminal money (Van der Wielen, 2001: 63-78).
Thirdly, a project was set up to keep organised crime away from certain regional 
areas and economic branches of the city. Initially, this project focused on the 
notorious Red Light District, but after three years of operating successfully, the 
project expanded to other areas and branches in the city. Some examples of the 
19  For an overview, see Fijnaut (2002).
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selected areas are run-down streets in poor areas with a high number of immigrants; 
the most expensive shopping street in the city; and the industrial harbour district. 
Some examples of the selected branches are the so-called smart shops that may 
participate in drug trafﬁcking, phone centres that may be used for illegal money 
transfers, and the escort business that may be used for the exploitation of trafﬁcked 
women. Basically, the project team follows a two-step approach. The ﬁrst step is 
the collection and analysis of data on the selected areas or branches. The team 
is given access to all the relevant information from the local authorities on the 
housing situation and the use of the real estate in the selected areas and branches. 
By linking this information to open sources, such as the municipal register and 
the land registry, the team should be able to map out which legal and natural 
persons are the owners of the real estate and the local businesses. The project 
team is then given special authority by the Minister of Justice to collect data from 
the police, the public prosecutor and in some cases the ﬁscal authorities. Through 
the combination of this information with data from the municipal authorities, an 
assessment can be made of the involvement of criminals in the selected area. The 
second step is to take measures on the basis of this assessment. Besides criminal 
investigations and ﬁscal claims, administrative measures can be taken such as the 
refusal or withdrawal of permits and the closure of certain establishments, for 
instance when a bar plays a role in drug trafﬁcking. Finally, the project team also 
takes civil measures, such as purchasing real estate to prevent it from falling into 
the hands of criminal organisations.
The project in Amsterdam is an example of a multi-agency approach in which 
several agencies cooperate by sharing information and integral enforcement. 
Although an evaluation is still in progress, the project in Amsterdam is considered a 
success by those involved. It has created awareness of the threats of organised crime 
within the civil service, the city and neighbourhood councils, and it has produced 
results in preventing organised crime inﬁltrating certain businesses. 
3.1.7. The BIBOB Act
Following the example of Italy and New York, the Netherlands has also developed 
an administrative approach to organised crime. A draft bill was passed by Parliament 
and implemented mid-2003. The new BIBOB Act (Bevordering Integriteitsbeoorde-
lingen door het Openbaar Bestuur – Ensuring Integrity of Decisions by the Public 
Administration) creates a legal basis to refuse or withdraw permits, licences, grants 
and subsidies when there is a serious threat of abuse by criminals.20 
20  The scope of the BIBOB screening system is limited to certain branches of industry 
which are considered to be vulnerable to organised crime: hotels and restaurants, the sex 
industry, the construction industry, waste processing, public housing and transport.
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It must be noted that the original purpose of the law was to prevent organised 
crime from inﬁltrating legitimate sectors, but the text of the law leaves room for 
broader measures. The act aims to avert the danger of subsidies or licences being 
used to spend the proceeds of crime, or that subsidies or licences are used to com-
mit a punishable offence (for example, a transport company is established with 
the purpose of moving drugs). Permits and subsidies will be refused if punishable 
offences (such as corruption) are committed during the application procedure. All 
decisions must be based on a screening process and risk assessment of the integrity 
of the applicant, which is not conducted by the governmental body itself, but by a 
special agency, the BIBOB Bureau, which is located at the Department of Justice 
in The Hague. This body also screens participants in public tender procedures for 
the application of the grounds for exclusion in European Union Directives. 
The purpose of this bureau is to support local public authorities, such as city 
administrations, municipalities and provinces, in enforcing the law. The bureau has 
the authority to consult criminal and tax records as well as police intelligence on 
organised crime. On the basis of the administrative and ﬁnancial information, the 
bureau provides the requesting authority with written advice, in which it indicates 
the seriousness of the threat of abuse. The requesting authority remains responsible 
and may disregard the advice of the BIBOB. When an application is denied, the 
public authority itself must explain its reasons for doing so to the applicant.
The BIBOB Act has been widely discussed in the Netherlands, both inside and 
outside of Parliament. Attention was drawn to the discriminatory nature of the act 
and the stigmatising effects of singling out speciﬁc branches for screening. The 
issue of false positives and negatives was also raised. Dubious applicants would 
be able to learn from earlier negative experiences and use ʻstraw men  ʼor complex 
legal entities to assume an appearance of honesty.
Conversely, applicants with prior convictions, but with honourable intentions, 
would run the risk of being unfairly excluded. The government countered the criti-
cism by pointing out that the BIBOB Bureau would have access to a wide range 
of databases, thus ensuring effective and well-founded advice.21 
Six months after the BIBOB Act came into force, it is too early to judge its 
effectiveness. The governmental bodies involved seem reticent, and the number of 
requests for advice is still low.22 The main objection that can be raised to the BIBOB 
Act is that it is not precisely tailored to organised crime in the Netherlands. While 
the New York mob tried to acquire positions of power in legal markets, the core 
business of criminal organisations in the Netherlands lies within illegal markets. 
21  For an overview of the debate, see Heddeghem (2002).
22  In a discussion with the author in December 2003 a BIBOB ofﬁcer said that since the 
Act came into force, only three requests for advice had been submitted.
 701
 Organised Crime Policies in the Netherlands
This type of crime – mostly transit crime – tends to move about. The perpetrators 
are not interested in establishing themselves in the legal world to dominate a 
legal market. Of course, organised crime in the Netherlands will indeed acquire 
property and buy itself into companies, if only to invest the proceeds of crime. In 
this sense, the BIBOB approach could have some value, but given the nature of 
criminal organisations in the Netherlands, we should not expect too much of the 
BIBOB Act as an instrument to contain organised crime.
3.2. Repression
In addition to the attention given to preventive measures, the police and the justice 
system have obviously devoted much of their attention to repression, i.e. criminal 
investigations with a view to prosecute organised criminals and see them sentenced. 
During the 1990s, there were two important developments in the repressive ap-
proach. First, an attempt was made to better tackle the problem through a ﬁnancial 
approach. The second track was aimed at expanding and regulating special methods 
of investigation.
3.2.1. The Financial Approach
Until well into the 1980s, the existing legal possibilities to seize the proceeds of 
crime were rarely used. The authorities were focused on convicting the perpetrators 
and seemed blind to the ﬁnancial aspects of criminal cases. All this changed in the 
mid-1980s. The argument for criminal prosecution ʻ with an eye on the money  ʼwas 
increasingly voiced (Keyser-Ringnalda, 1994: 128). At the time, this heightened 
awareness among police ofﬁcers and public prosecutors was certainly not unique 
to the Netherlands. There was a growing interest around the world in retrieving 
and seizing the proceeds of crime, especially when they were linked to drug traf-
ﬁcking. The Treaty of Vienna (1988), drawn up under the auspices of the United 
Nations, stipulated that international cooperation should be improved, in order 
to advance the conﬁscation of the proceeds of drug crimes (Keyser-Ringnalda, 
1994: 167-8).
In the Netherlands, the forfeiture of the direct proceeds of criminal offences 
and working capital used for the committing of crimes was already a legal option. 
There was also a sanction in Dutch law aimed at the conﬁscation of the proceeds 
of crime. In 1993, this sanction was enlarged to include new applications. Before 
this change was effected, proceeds of crime could only be conﬁscated if a direct 
link was proven between the proceeds and the offence for which the defendant was 
convicted. Since 1993, proceeds can be conﬁscated from offences similar to the 
offence for which the defendant is convicted or other serious offences. It is however 
required that there are sufﬁcient indications that the convicted person has indeed 
committed these crimes. The burden of proof is even lower if a convicted person 
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has considerable assets but no regular income: if he cannot make a reasonable case 
for the legitimate origin of his capital, it can be conﬁscated. 
The 1993 Act also enlarged the possibilities for tracing the proﬁts of crime. 
In cases of serious offences, a special ﬁnancial investigation can be launched. 
Police and judicial authorities now have special powers to investigate the ﬁnancial 
aspects of crime. Police ofﬁcers can coerce people with ﬁnancial relations to the 
person under investigation to give information about his ﬁnancial affairs. Within 
the framework of a ﬁnancial investigation, regular powers of investigation, such 
as a house search and the seizure of goods, can also be brought into action. The 
ﬁnancial investigation can even continue after the conviction of the person under 
investigation, but it must be completed within two years of him or her being found 
guilty. The new Act was severely criticised for all these far-reaching elements, 
but the Minister of Justice succeeded in gaining a parliamentary majority. As 
mentioned earlier, this was not the time to raise critical questions as far as dealing 
with organised crime was concerned. Besides, the Minister played his trump card: 
he suggested that the beneﬁts of broadening the law (which would entail investing 
in the police force and the justice system) would soon outweigh the costs, since 
the conﬁscated funds would ﬂood back into the treasury.23
Two evaluation studies (1998 and 2002) have assessed the effectiveness of the 
proceeds-of-crime approach in the 1990s (Nelen and Sabee, 1998; Faber and Van 
Nunen, 2002). Both indicated that the 1993 Act has not delivered on its promises, at 
least not yet. Between 1996 and 2001, public prosecutors have tried to use the Act to 
conﬁscate proceeds of crime in approximately 9,000 cases, according to a detailed 
study by Faber and Van Nunen (2004). Forty per cent of these cases were drug-related, 
and 30 per cent concerned theft. In the majority of these cases the amounts of money 
involved were relatively low. In 84 per cent of the cases the estimated amount of 
illegally obtained income did not exceed € 45,000. Only in 2 per cent of the cases the 
estimated level of criminal proﬁts exceeded € 450,000 (Faber et al., 2002: 461-72). 
A large number of cases were settled out of court or are still waiting for a ﬁnal ruling. 
Judges ruled on approximately 5,500 cases between 1995 and 2000. The sum total of 
the monies that were actually deprived during the period 1995-2001 amounted to no 
more than € 27 million. Another striking result is the huge gap between the values 
of the deprivation orders passed by the courts (€ 129 million) and the execution of 
these deprivation orders (€ 9 million) (Faber et al., 2002).
It appears from both evaluation studies that the application of the new legal 
possibilities has been frustrated by a severe lack of knowledge within the police 
and the public prosecution department about ﬁnancial matters, civil law, banking 
regulations, and other relevant non-penal laws and practices (Nelen, 2000). But 
there is a normative as well as a cognitive aspect to the problem: judges still seem 
23  For a detailed analysis of the debate, see Nelen (2000: 51-5).
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rather ambivalent towards the legislation as a whole, mostly because of certain 
unclear provisions and the far-reaching elements of the law.24 The majority of 
police ofﬁcers, in their turn, do not regard the deprivation of assets as an important 
and rewarding element of their job. The proceeds-of-crime approach is primarily 
regarded as an activity that is complex, not very exciting and, above all, generates 
poor results. The concept of ﬁnancial policing is not in line with their perceptions 
of what real policing should be about. The conﬁscation of illegally obtained assets 
is still considered a fairly low priority among the list of daily tasks (Nelen and 
Sabee, 1998; Faber and Van Nunen, 2002). 
The question arises as to whether the broadening of the legislation in 1993 was 
really necessary. A remarkable ﬁnding in the study by Nelen and Sabee (1998) tells 
us that between 1993 and 1998 the police ofﬁcers and judicial authorities, who 
had claimed these new statutory powers, relied almost entirely on the ʻold  ʼlegal 
instruments in deprivation procedures. The proceeds-of-crime approach aimed at 
demonstrating the power of the judicial authorities in their struggle against organised 
crime. The results of the evaluation studies show quite the opposite: instead of its 
strength, the proceeds-of crime-approach has revealed the weakness of the state in 
its efforts to counteract organised crime (Nelen, 2003: 127-36). These results are 
not unique to the Netherlands. Studies from abroad also underline the difﬁculties 
in actually depriving criminals of their assets.25
3.2.2. The Special Powers of Investigation Act (BOB Act 2000)
In the 1990s, especially after the IRT scandal, in-depth discussions were held in 
the Netherlands on the acceptability and the standardisation of special methods 
of investigation in the ﬁght against organised crime. As a result of the analysis 
made by the Van Traa parliamentary inquiry commission a bill was drafted, which 
became the Special Powers of Investigation Act (BOB Act – Wet Bijzondere 
Opsporingsbevoegdheden), with the purpose of regulating special investigative 
methods and improving the administration of police investigations.26 
24  Nelen and Sabee (1998). The judges criticised in particular the vague deﬁnition of 
ʻproceeds of crimeʼ.
25  For an overview of the situation in the United Kingdom, see Levi et al. (1995); for the 
German experience, see Gradowski and Siegler (1997).
26  The Supreme Court of the Netherlands was another stimulating factor. Two months before 
the publication of the ﬁnal report of the Van Traa commission in 1996, the Supreme Court 
ruled that unlawful actions during a criminal investigation could lead to the inadmissibil-
ity of a case (HR 19-12-1995, NJ 1996, 249). While the Van Traa commission focused 
on the integrity of the police force and the public prosecutors, the judges emphasised 
the importance of the legal standardisation of methods of investigation, with a view to 
protecting the basic civil rights of citizens. 
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Responding to the situation in the early 1990s, when investigative methods 
without a statutory basis were developed on the shop ﬂoor, the new Act is based 
on the premise that particularly those methods of investigation that could seriously 
affect the integrity of the investigation or the ability to monitor it, or could infringe 
on civil rights, should have a statutory basis. This is why the new Act does not 
contain a systematic description of all methods, but focuses instead on a number 
of ʻspecial  ʼinvestigative methods. A recurring theme is the need to monitor the 
decision-making process to apply a certain method, as well as the actual imple-
mentation. The Act conﬁrms that the public prosecutor is the appropriate ofﬁcial in 
leading police investigations and that special powers of investigation can only be 
used after the public prosecutor has issued a warrant. The judicial authorities must 
be open with the person under investigation. This means that the public prosecutor 
must inform the person who is the subject of the special investigation as soon as 
the interests of the investigation allow for it, as a safeguard against the secret use 
of special investigative methods, particularly if the investigation preliminary to 
prosecution does not lead to a criminal trial. The Act greatly values accountability 
to both the judiciary and the defence regarding the use of special investigative 
methods. This is why the Act requires proper recording of all the steps that were 
taken when special methods were used during the investigation. 
The Act provides for three undercover powers: covert investigation (inﬁltration), 
pseudo-purchase/services, and systematically obtaining intelligence about suspects 
through undercover investigation. Inﬁltration is deﬁned as participating with a group 
of people believed to have committed crimes or to be planning crimes. Contrary 
to existing practices, the Act states that civilians can only act as inﬁltrators under 
exceptional circumstances.27 As a result of the experiences with criminal police 
informers that were at the heart of the IRT scandal, it is expressly stated that 
criminals may not be deployed as civilian inﬁltrators. The Act assigns a special 
status to pseudo-purchase/services, because this method can also be used without 
it being part of an inﬁltration. The Act conﬁrms existing case law and directives 
by the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce in stating that pseudo-purchase/services is only 
permitted if the person under investigation is not entrapped by the investigative 
method; his ʻoriginal  ʼintent must be on the transaction. Systematically gathering 
intelligence entails undercover activities such as frequenting the suspectʼs haunts, 
without it being apparent that the investigator is a police ofﬁcer. This special 
investigative power is bound by fewer conditions than inﬁltration, because the 
27  For example, if the public prosecutor ﬁnds that inﬁltration (covert investigation) by a 
police ofﬁcer is impossible, he can deploy a civilian inﬁltrator. A written agreement 
must be drafted containing the reward and possible indemniﬁcation. The same applies 
to the involvement of civilians in pseudo-purchase/services.
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investigating ofﬁcer is not committing punishable acts, and is not exposed to as 
much risk as an inﬁltrator.
The new Act has also deﬁned powers that were not exercised in practice before. 
A striking example is the recording of conversations behind closed doors. Record-
ing conﬁdential communications in a private residence is now permitted under 
strict conditions.28 Another major diversion from existing practices is that the Act 
prohibits harmful or dangerous substances or goods from entering the market. If 
an investigative ofﬁcer is aware of the location of prohibited objects through using 
one of the special investigative powers, he or she is obliged to seize these objects. 
In other words, the Act puts a stop to the police strategy of controlled delivery. 
However, it allows for an exception: the public prosecutor can decide not to seize 
the objects if a serious investigative interest is at stake.29
In 2002, the WODC evaluated the ﬁrst experiences of police ofﬁcers and justice 
authorities (Bokhorst et al., 2002). Their exploratory research was based on a total 
of 45 interviews, mainly with police ofﬁcers and public prosecutors.30 The research 
showed that the new Act has been well received by practitioners. The interviewees 
were generally positive about the clarity that the Act provides on the limits and 
possibilities of the application of special investigative powers, but they tended to 
comment on the proscription of controlled delivery. They criticised the fact that they 
were sometimes confronted with the obligation to seize small amounts of drugs, 
while they would have liked to let them slip by in order to get a clearer picture 
of the parties involved in the deal. The seizure of a shipment of any size tells the 
criminals involved that the police is on their trail. The respondents admitted to 
devising ways of avoiding these situations during the course of their work.31
The 2000 BOB Act has already been amended in one respect. Within the 
framework of the ﬁght against terrorism the explicit ban on the deployment of 
criminal civilian inﬁltrators was toned down. In March 2003, the Minister of Justice 
decided that the deployment of criminals as inﬁltrators should be possible ʻunder 
very exceptional circumstancesʼ. These circumstances could occur, he added, during 
investigations relating to terrorism (Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003).
28  It is permitted if it is urgently required for the investigation, if the offence carries a term 
of imprisonment of eight years or more, and the examining magistrate has given explicit 
authority.
29  This is governed by a stringent approval procedure; the board of procurators general 
must agree on a decision not to seize the objects. This decision must be presented in 
advance to the Minister of Justice.
30  Some interviews were conducted with judges and lawyers.
31  Allegedly, the police listen in on the suspectʼs telephone conversations in a ʻselective  ʼ
manner, purposely ʻremaining in the dark  ʼ about the transport of banned objects or 
substances. In this way, they can avoid the obligation to intervene.
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3.2.3. The Effectiveness of the Different Methods of Investigation
With all the emphasis on special methods of investigation, one would almost forget 
that ʻ ordinary  ʼmethods are still being used, such as interrogating suspects and wit-
nesses, conducting house searches, observing and tailing persons under investigation 
in the streets or in public spaces, and monitoring telephone conversations. How do 
the police manage to solve organised crime cases and which methods contribute 
most to their success? 
The Dutch Organised Crime Monitor32 looked at 40 criminal investigations into 
organised crime in order to determine which methods contributed most to putting a 
case together.33 It turned out that wire-tapping (whether or not in combination with 
other methods) delivered the best results. In a large number of cases signiﬁcant 
evidence was obtained through observation.34 Statements from suspects and 
witnesses made during interrogation provide the third largest contribution to the 
evidence (Kleemans et al., 2002: 88-92). These three methods of investigation 
have been in use in the Netherlands for a long time, and in this sense they could 
be termed ʻtraditionalʼ. In other words, it was neither ﬁnancial detective work, 
nor the application of the special methods in use at the time (controlled delivery 
and inﬁltration, including pseudo-purchase), that brought results, but ʻtraditional  ʼ
ways of collecting evidence. 
Insofar as the researchers were able to determine, the method of inﬁltration was 
used in 3 out of the 40 cases, but in none of the cases did these actions contribute 
to the successful conclusion of the investigation. The method of long-term inﬁltra-
tion is not used in the Netherlands – undercover operations are usually short and 
relatively superﬁcial. In 1999, a unique empirical research study was published 
on the effectiveness of all inﬁltration operations conducted in the Netherlands 
during 1996 (involving 12 criminal investigations). On the basis of interviews with 
police ofﬁcers, public prosecutors and examining judges, and after studying the 
relevant police ﬁles, the researchers concluded that in only ﬁve investigations the 
inﬁltration operations contributed (partially or fully) to realising the initial goals 
of the operation (Kruissink et al., 1999).
In conclusion, it has to be said that despite high hopes, the ﬁnancial approach to 
organised crime never really got off the ground. Broadening the legal framework 
32  For more on this, see Kleemansʼs contribution in Part II. The Organised Crime Monitor 
is a continuing research project using police ﬁles on major criminal investigations to 
describe and analyse organised crime. The project started in 1996 and is still running. 
Up to December 2003, a total of 83 cases have been studied.
33  The police investigation in these cases was closed in 1998 or in 1999.
34  Observation can be ʻstatic  ʼ(e.g. installing cameras trained at a warehouse or a place of 
residence), or ʻdynamic  ʼ(e.g. placing a bug in order to trace a suspectʼs car).
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for conﬁscation did not lead to any major claims against criminal organisations, 
with the exception of only a handful of cases. In practice, the application of the 
law resulted in small amounts of money recovered and in relatively insigniﬁcant 
cases, which were not related to organised crime.
The second track, the speciﬁcation and the regulation of special investigative 
methods, has more importance for the ﬁght against organised crime. It remains to be 
seen how effective the BOB Act will actually be, but it is a considerable improve-
ment over the murky situation that existed before the IRT scandal. Despite all the 
discussions in the Netherlands about these matters, the investigating, prosecuting 
and trying of criminals did not suddenly come to a halt in the 1990s. It turned out that 
ordinary and ʻtraditional  ʼmethods of investigation, such as wire-taps, observation 
and interrogating suspects and witnesses, also yield a return when applied to the 
ﬁght against organised crime.
4. Law Enforcement Agencies
Dutch citizens have an ambivalent attitude towards powerful state agencies, such 
as the army and the police. Their existence is recognised as a necessary evil. The 
Netherlands is a constitutional democracy with a fundamental distinction between 
Parliament and government (legislature), administration (executive) and jurisdiction 
(the independent judiciary). In this system the police is one of the agencies of the 
administration, bound by the law and controlled by the judiciary. But even inside 
the administration, control is institutionalised by the division of authority. Dutch 
police are hierarchically controlled both on the national and the local level by a 
dual authority: the public administrator35 and the public prosecutor.36 The public 
administrator is responsible for the management of the police and the execution 
of non-criminal police duties such as patrolling, while the public prosecutor is 
responsible for police investigations. In this way, the police are prevented from 
gaining too powerful a stronghold in society
In addition to this dual authority, there was always another means to control 
police power and that was decentralisation. Less than 15 years ago, the Dutch 
police consisted of approximately 150 local forces, but this fragmentation was 
gradually reduced and there are now 25 regional forces in the Netherlands. Against 
this historical background, the call for inter-regional cooperation in the ﬁght 
against organised crime that was heard in the late 1980s was somewhat unusual. 
35  At the national level, public administration exercises authority through the Minister of 
the Interior, at the local level through the mayor.
36  At the national level by the Minister of Justice and the national leadership of the Public 
Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce, at the local level by the local public prosecutor.
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As described earlier, the largest inter-regional collaboration (between the forces 
of Amsterdam, Haarlem/Schiphol and Utrecht) came to a tumultuous end in 1993, 
but cooperation between the police forces did not die with it. On the contrary, away 
from the public clamour about the IRT scandal, all over the country collaborations 
or ʻcore teams  ʼwere formed that are still operational today. More than that, in the 
summer of 2003 these core teams (organised crime squads) were extracted from 
the regional forces and made into an independent National Criminal Investigation 
Service (Nationale Recherche). By Dutch standards this is an unusual situation and 
it deserves somewhat greater attention.
It should be noted that the repression of organised crime is not just a job for the 
ʻordinary  ʼpolice force. In the Netherlands, certain police tasks (such as detective 
work) are also carried out by agencies other than the police. These ʻspecial  ʼpolice 
organisations are charged with detecting speciﬁc types of crime such as tax fraud, 
economic crime and environmental crime. Because organised crime involved in the 
production of illegal drugs or human smuggling is usually also in breach of these 
speciﬁc laws, the specialised agencies participate in large-scale police investigations 
into organised crime. The role of the Royal Marechaussee and Customs should be 
mentioned in this context, since both are involved in border control (persons and 
goods) and investigations. A public prosecutor is always in charge of an investigation, 
but different ministers are responsible for the management and deployment of person-
nel of these agencies. The Minister of Finance, for instance, manages the Tax and 
Customs Services, while the Minister of Defence is responsible for the management 
of the Royal Marechaussee. In the past few years, cooperation between ordinary and 
special police branches has intensiﬁed (Fijnaut and Van de Bunt, 2000: 7-40). In 
investigations into certain forms of organised crime there is intensive cooperation 
between the ordinary police forces and other agencies, for instance in the approach 
to the production and export of ecstasy. The Synthetic Drugs Unit (which is one of 
the core teams) is a ʻmultidisciplinary  ʼteam. The Economic Inspection Service, to 
give another example, is responsible for tackling precursors. Customs and the Royal 
Marechaussee control the border trafﬁc (outgoing parcel post, baggage scanners, and 
so on). The National Trafﬁc Inspectorate analyses and controls the transport sector, 
including ecstasy couriers. And of course the regular police will carry out police 
investigations (Ministerie van Justitie et al., 2001). In concrete police investigations 
the members of all the agencies involved are supposed to work together. 
4.1. From Core Teams to a National Criminal Investigation Service
Between 1993 and 1995, six core teams (former IRTs) were set up with the purpose 
of combating supra-regional organised crime. They were composed of 55-100 of-
ﬁcers serving on the different regional forces. Each core team had its own area for 
special attention, such as a geographical region (South America, eastern Europe), 
infrastructure (Schiphol Airport, the port of Rotterdam), or type of organised crime 
 709
 Organised Crime Policies in the Netherlands
(human smuggling, heroin, synthetic drugs). Furthermore, in 1995 a so-called 
ʻnationwide investigation team  ʼ was established to carry out investigations of 
national importance and, in particular, to respond to international requests for 
support in criminal investigations. From 1995 until the present, a total of some 800 
police ofﬁcers have participated in the core teams on a yearly basis, which is about 2 
per cent of the total Dutch police force. In addition, separate departments to combat 
organised crime were created within the larger regional forces. A conservative 
estimate puts the total number of police ofﬁcers responsible for the investigation 
of organised crime at 1,000. Despite the wide range of areas for special attention, 
a great deal of time and resources are spent on one type of organised crime, i.e. the 
drugs trade. An inventory of ongoing investigations into organised crime revealed 
that in 2001 the majority of police investigations were focused on the production, 
trade and/or transport of drugs.37
An evaluation study concluded that the core teams performed reasonably well 
(Klerks et al., 2002). The added value of the core teams depended not so much on a 
surplus of expertise, but on cohesion and continuity. Because a core team was able 
to devote years of investigation into, for instance, Turkish heroin cases, knowledge 
based on experience increased signiﬁcantly, according to the researchers (Klerks 
et al., 2002: 86). The evaluation study was particularly critical of the way the core 
teams were managed, especially of the decision-making structure that assigned 
cases to the teams. Sometimes it took a year or more before a core team received 
permission to start an investigation into a certain criminal group. The researchers 
concluded that too many judicial and administrative authorities were allowed to 
have their say in the decision-making process (Klerks et al., 2002: 73-4).
In 2002, the newly formed Cabinet decided to place the assignment of cases 
in the hands of a central body consisting of a number of public prosecutors and 
public administrators, chaired by an attorney general of the Public Prosecutorʼs 
Ofﬁce (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken et al., 2002). A strong argument for this 
centralised arrangement was that the position of the national public prosecutor would 
be reinforced and that priorities in tackling organised crime could be established 
on the basis of a nationwide understanding of the problems involved. Another 
important consideration was that a national body could serve as a focal point for 
communicating with foreign police forces, establishing a national investigation 
service would improve international police cooperation, the government stated 
(Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken et al., 2002: 8). The different core teams would 
remain housed at a number of police forces all over the country, but in a formal 
37  In 2001, 146 investigations into organised crime in the Netherlands were listed and 90 
of them (62 per cent) were related to drugs crimes. In 2000 slightly more than half of 
the investigations (53 per cent) were drug related. See Nationale Drugmonitor (2002).
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sense a new National Criminal Investigation Service would come into existence, in 
which a total of 900 police ofﬁcers would participate (Minister van Justitie et al., 
2002). In mid-2003 this service became a reality. It is interesting to note that there 
was another argument put forward for a National Criminal Investigation Service, 
which may shed light on what is perhaps the hidden agenda. A preliminary study 
on this unit stated in so many words that the citizens feel unprotected by the police 
and that a loss of legitimacy could be imminent. The regional forces ʻshould give 
the highest priority to combating violent criminality and harassment in the public 
spaceʼ. The formation of a National Criminal Investigation Service was then justiﬁed 
with the argument that the regional police forces would be better able to focus on 
preventing the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.38
When the unit was formally launched, ministers explicitly stated that the 
National Criminal Investigation Service is aimed at the investigation of organised 
crime (Ministerie van Justitie et al., 2002). International fraud or corporate crime 
are not within its scope of interest. A document that was recently published by the 
National Criminal Investigation Service elaborates on the interpretation of its task. 
It seems to copy its areas of special interest from the former core teams, but in some 
respects the document is innovative. It emphasises a crime-prevention approach to 
organised crime; its central point is that the investigative strategy should not focus 
on seizing the drugs or arresting the perpetrators, but on tackling the facilitating 
circumstances. Referring to the results of a recent report by the Organised Crime 
Monitor the document states: 
The fact that organised crime in the Netherlands is to a large extent transit 
crime, (implies that) the National Criminal Investigation Service will have to 
focus a lot of its attention on the intersections of the physical infrastructure; 
harbours, airports, roads, waterways. It is in these areas that the Service must 
gather intelligence (Korps Landelijk Politiediensten, 2003: 50). 
The document also argues strongly in favour of police intervention in the logistics 
of organised crime. To this end ʻ knowledge [must be] acquired about local patterns 
of meeting places, storage facilities, monetary transactions and other logistic 
facilitiesʼ. The Service should also ʻ try to learn more about the contacts and connec-
tions between local (often ethnic) communities and source countries for contraband  ʼ
(Korps Landelijk Politiediensten, 2003: 51). Time will tell to what extent these 
ambitions can be realised; as it stands, the thinking on the implementation of these 
intentions is still developing.
38  Working paper, Misdaad laat zich tegenhouden. Amsterdam, 2001, 11 (unpublished).
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4.2. Centralising the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce
In the last few decades, the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce has been at the centre of the 
debate on the administration of criminal justice. In light of the delicate relations 
between politics and the judiciary, the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce is in a precarious 
position. In a formal sense, it is, on the one hand, part of the independent judiciary, 
and, on the other hand, an administrative service within the area of responsibility 
of the Minister of Justice. The increased political interest in the administration of 
criminal justice in the Netherlands has had a direct impact on the position of the 
Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce. At the risk of simplifying matters, it seems clear that, 
partly as a result of a change in the law, the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce is now more 
a part of the Department of Justice than before, and the Minister of Justice exercises 
more control over the actions of the public prosecutors through a strengthened 
central leadership. The IRT scandal and the ensuing legislation accelerated this 
development to a considerable extent; after all, the BOB Act requires the approval 
of the central leadership of the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce (the council of Attorney 
Generals) and the approval of the Minister of Justice for the use of special powers 
(such as the deployment of civilian inﬁltrators, criminal inﬁltrators, and controlled 
deliveries). This structure of responsibility calls for a different type of organisation. 
Instead of the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce of the recent past, with its decentralised 
organisation, which left more than a little discretionary room to individual public 
prosecutors, there is now an organisation in place where decisions are guided by 
directives and consultations within a hierarchical structure.
The Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce ﬁnds itself, of course, in another intermediate 
position: the one between investigation and trial. Public prosecutors direct the 
investigation and they are the only ones to decide whether or not a case comes 
before a judge. Until not too long ago, the general requirement that a public 
prosecutor direct the investigation, was almost a dead letter. In practice, the 
police were given a fairly free reign to conduct criminal investigations, unless 
there was a need for the public prosecutor or the examining judge regarding the 
use of methods of coercion, such as a wire-tap or a search of someoneʼs premises. 
As a result of this attitude of aloofness, all sorts of investigative methods were 
thought out on the shop ﬂoor which would eventually lead to the IRT scandal in 
the 1990s. Since then, the position of the public prosecutor during the investiga-
tion has changed dramatically. The Special Powers of Investigation Act assumes 
his or her direct involvement in criminal investigations, whereas the role of the 
examining judge has been reduced. The ﬁrst evaluation studies indicate that 
public prosecutors are indeed taking more control of investigations, although the 
police ofﬁcers who were interviewed criticised the divergence in approach and in 
the interpretation of the task as used by individual public prosecutors (Bokhorst 
et al., 2002: 94-101). As with the National Criminal Investigation Service, the 
increasing need for international cooperation led to the creation of a focal point 
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within the organisation and, in addition to the 19 local ofﬁces, a separate Public 
Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce was created in 1996. It is in charge of enhancing international 
judicial and police cooperation and is responsible for managing investigations of 
national or international importance. Nowadays, the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce is 
also responsible for the National Criminal Investigation Service. 
5. Conclusions
During the 1990s, organised crime was a major issue in the Netherlands. It has left 
its mark on the legislation and on the organisation of the administration of criminal 
justice. The IRT scandal heavily inﬂuenced this process. The changes that were made 
have led to a situation where the police and the justice system are better prepared 
to combat organised crime. The crime ﬁghters now have a better understanding of 
the legal opportunities and boundaries of the different methods of investigation. 
The organisation of the police and the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce is more tailored to 
the demands of the ﬁght against international crime. Centralisation, a hierarchical 
structure and pooling of knowledge and information are some of the catchwords 
that characterise these changes. 
Attempts were also made to confront organised crime with ﬁnancial repercus-
sions. In the 1990s, this approach, aimed at taking away the proceeds of crime, 
rarely produced the desired results. The application of this method was frustrated 
by a lack of expertise and motivation among the ofﬁcers responsible. The recently 
established National Criminal Investigation Service has devised a new strategy, 
designed to disrupt criminal groups  ʼ logistic operations. The beneﬁts of this 
strategy are still obscure. For the time being, there is the hard fact that many cases 
are solved using ʻtraditional  ʼpolice methods, such as observation, interrogation 
and wire-tapping. The effects of the recent Special Powers of Investigation Act on 
criminal investigations are also not yet clear. 
In addition to the criminal approach, a course of action based on prevention 
was developed from the early 1990s onwards. The administrative approach of the 
BIBOB Act and the MOT Act are the main examples of this trend. The preventive 
approach has clearly taken root in the Netherlands, but the problem of measuring 
its effects remains an issue. Under the MOT Act, many unusual transactions are 
being reported by ﬁnancial institutions, but it is unclear whether or not the MOT 
regime has managed to stop criminals from laundering the proceeds of their crimes. 
In a more general sense, it can be said that it is difﬁcult to gauge the effects of 
preventive measures. The question for the near future will be how long the services 
involved are willing to incur visible costs for invisible results.
While all sorts of measures were taken to tackle organised crime and while the 
police and the Public Prosecutorʼs Ofﬁce were reorganised to deal with this type 
of criminality, the publicʼs interest in organised crime waned considerably. These 
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days, the minds of the Dutch citizens are occupied by feelings of insecurity in their 
own neighbourhood, by loitering youngsters and by various kinds of antisocial 
behaviour. Organised crime remains an important issue nonetheless. The attention 
given to incidents such as the killing of a well-known criminal or the publication 
of a research report on organised crime demonstrates that the theme of organised 
crime still generates a great deal of interest and concern.39
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